Task Forces
Task Forces
Doland at Hill 63
The 3rd
NVA Regiment thought they owned the
by James F. Humphries
"Units of the 3rd Regiment, 2nd North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division dug in near Hill 63," summarized the flash message
into the tactical operations center (TOC) of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB)
"Chargers." It was the day before Thanksgiving 1967, and the place was the
fertile
The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry (4/31), one of
the three infantry battalions assigned to the 196th LIB, was operating in a split mode.
Company A secured the battalion's new fire support base (FSB) at the
As luck would have it -- some might call it
destiny -- Task Force Dorland was conducting search operations only a few kilometers east
of Hill 63 when the intelligence report arrived at the brigade TOC. Dorland's task force
was quickly tagged to check the validity of the report, and he remembers getting the
message late that afternoon. "Many intelligence reports turned out to be inaccurate
or old," he said. "However, in this case, brigade noted that they had
intercepted a radio transmission from the vicinity of Hill 63, which gave the target more
immediacy than normal."
At 29, Gil Dorland had all of the necessary
credentials to command a unit in combat. Dorland had graduated from West Point, class of
1959, and attended the Airborne Ranger courses at
Dorland felt certain of his abilities to do the
job; most important, he had total confidence that his men were prepared to meet any
challenge. Task Force Dorland was indeed a powerful and well-led force. Companies B and D,
4/31, were commanded by two solid soldiers, Captains James Bierschmidt and Dan Mellon. The
two rifle companies formed the core of the task force. Two platoons of armored personnel
carriers (APCs) from F Troop, 17th Cavalry, provided Dorland mobility and quick reaction,
and four tanks from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, supplied the force a mighty punch.
Artillery fire support would be provided by Battery B, 3/82, and Battery C, 3/16, located
on
While Dorland had confidence in his men, he
also knew that the enemy he faced were not garden-variety Viet Cong armed with cast-off
French or American rifles of World War II vintage. The 3rd NVA Regiment was a first-rate
outfit whose soldiers had a reputation of being tough and resolute. They also knew the
valley. The 2nd NVA Division had made the
The 2nd NVA Division was also an elusive enemy.
Eight days earlier, intelligence analysts had placed all three of the division's regiments
in the rugged hills around the valley. However, the units moved often. Their forte was to
infiltrate the valley undetected, establish a textbook defensive position, then wait for
an allied unit to find them. Avenues of approach into the site were covered by machine
guns and anti-tank weapons and further protected by the unit's mortars. The enemy's
purpose was not to defend the terrain in the traditional sense. Instead, the position was
used as a bunkered ambush site from which they could inflict horrendous casualties on an
unsuspecting allied unit in a very short period of time. The enemy's scheme always
included a withdrawal that was executed before reinforcing allied units made the position
untenable. The scenario was repeated frequently, but its success was completely dependent
on the element of surprise. Unknown to the enemy, an intercepted radio transmission had
cost them that most critical component.
Despite the loss of surprise, the terrain
around Hill 63 favored the defender, in this case, the 5th and 7th companies, 2nd
Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment, which had slipped into the area sometime earlier. Two hills
dominated the surrounding paddies. Hill 63, the most prominent of the two, was a pile of
boulders and brush squatting between the Ly Ly River and National Route 534. Hill X was a
knobby thicket about 500 meters to the west of Hill 63. The scrub-covered slopes of both
hills provided the NVA excellent observation and a green curtain of natural camouflage
beneath which they had placed a string of mutually supporting bunkers and fighting
positions. A strip of paddies and wooded islands lay between the two hills. The islands
were a sinuous maze of straw houses and small gardens crisscrossed with impenetrable
hedgerows that channeled foot and vehicle movement to only a few trails. Visibility was
limited to 15 meters in any direction. The island's hedgerows, like the rocky mounds
above, were a network of nearly-invisible bunkers designed to exact a high price from an
attacker. It was a defender's paradise.
By dusk, Dorland had established his command
post in a wooded area 1,500 meters southeast of Hill 63 and pulled his units closer to the
objective. One platoon of cavalry and the four tanks established a night defensive
position several kilometers to the east. The other task force units prepared night
defensive positions within a kilometer of the objective area.
Dorland's plan for Thanksgiving was
straightforward. The infantry companies, backed by a platoon of "tracks" (APCs),
would search Hill 63. Company B would take the southern flank, and Company D would be on
the right. The 2nd Platoon, 17th Cavalry, would follow behind Company D. The 3rd platoon,
17th Cavalry, and the four tanks were designated as reserve and scheduled to occupy
positions near Hill 63 early the next morning. Dorland and his two-man command group would
colocate with the reserve. After Dorland had briefed his commanders on the next day's
plans, the task force settled in for an uneventful night.
Thanksgiving dawned colorless and wet. November
is the advent of the northeast monsoon in that part of
The men in Task Force Dorland warmed a C-ration
breakfast, shrugged off the damp chill and prepared to move. Leaders, up long before the
first ashy rays of light, made checks of their men and equipment and waited for the word
to move out. As the men strapped on their bulging rucksacks, there were probably some who
thought the sweep would turn into another meaningless drill of searching for the enemy.
Dorland recalls that he really did not know what to expect.
The units departed their night defensive
positions in the dirty morning light and started a cautious advance toward Hill 63.
Company B crossed the dirt road and closed on the southern end of the irregular hunk of
granite from the southwest. Company D approached the hill from the east. The 2nd Platoon,
F Troop, followed some distance behind. At 0630 hours, F Troop's 3rd Platoon, accompanied
by the four tanks, clanked into blocking positions southwest of the objective. The enemy
had not shown themselves.
D Company's Captain Dan Mellon's recollections
of the terrain and the events of that morning are vivid. "Hill 63 is bean-shaped. A
saddle is formed by the highest elevation on the south, and an oblong-shaped structure of
boulders, running generally northwest to southeast, located on the north. The elevation of
the boulders is not much lower than the hill's highest point. Dorland couldn't see this
formation. By radio, we agreed that I would pass to the left of it while maintaining close
contact with his right flank and visual contact with the APCs on my right flank. I ordered
my fourth platoon, which was my right flank, to sweep up and along the boulders."
Company D, sweating under their heavy loads,
approached the base of the hill and slowly started up the slope. Above, two enemy
machine-gunners watched the approaching Americans from positions hidden at the end of a
thick hedgerow. The gunners waited until the company's lead elements were within 10 to 15
feet of their positions; then, almost simultaneously, they opened up with a long,
ear-splitting burst of fire. Several men from the 2nd and 3rd platoons went down in the
fusillade, but the enemy's success was short-lived. Mellon's 4th Platoon, which now
occupied the rocky structure on the north end of the hill, took them under fire and
quickly silenced the guns.
Company D's encounter with the machine guns had
been startlingly abrupt and expensive. The 2nd Platoon lost four men killed and six
wounded, and the 3rd Platoon sustained five seriously wounded. It was far from over. Other
bold, yet undetected, NVA continued to blaze at them from their brush-covered foxholes
only 10 to 20 meters to their flanks.
Mellon remembers: "I advised Dorland of my
problem, and we agreed that my fourth platoon would remain static on the rocky structure.
He directed that my second platoon slide left and linkup with his right flank. Elements of
my first platoon were to fall back and secure an LZ for medical evacuation [medevac]
helicopters and also sweep some areas we had bypassed.
"My third platoon was still in trouble,
and at that time we had not determined what was causing the damage. I linked up with my
third platoon leader at a big boulder located at the lower end of the hedgerow to help him
figure out the situation. After the better part of an hour, and two more wounded, we
identified and eliminated three spider holes. During this time, my second platoon was
sharing C-4 plastic explosive with the APC crews to destroy bunkers along the base of the
hill below my fourth platoon's position."
While Company D shucked their heavy rucksacks,
found cover and fought the enemy near at hand, the trailing cavalry platoon put the pedal
to the metal and roared around the northern end of the hill. As the tracks crashed through
the undergrowth and skidded to a halt on the rocky hillside, their gunners blistered the
enemy's positions with .50-caliber machine-gun fire.
The metal monsters were no doubt a welcome
sight to Delta Company. The NVA were not readily intimidated, however, and intensified
their fire. A recoilless rifle cracked from across a paddy west of the hill and slammed a
57mm anti-tank shell into an APC. One cavalryman died and seven others were wounded.
Company B had taken only occasional fire up to
that point, and Dorland directed Bierschmidt toward the contact. As the company moved
toward the action, one of the men from 1st Lt. Jerome Dickey's 1st Platoon spotted a rifle
sticking out of a hole. The rifleman tossed a grenade into the position, killing an NVA
officer. The enemy light machine gun was captured. Shortly after capturing the gun,
Company B ran into a cyclone of fire from a line of meticulously camouflaged bunkers deep
inside a hedgerow. Bierschmidt's advance faltered, and Dorland quickly decided to commit
the reserve.
Dorland remembers: "I commanded the
cavalry to move rapidly to the battle area, charging into a marsh covered with high grass
between the two hills, catching the enemy completely by surprise. Numerous NVA soldiers
scrambled (literally beneath the APCs' tracks) for cover. Had we not had the element of
surprise, catching the enemy out of their holes, we most likely would have been
annihilated like the Marines and other units who confronted the regiment."
For a few minutes, the scene around the
personnel carriers was an inextricable mix of friend and foe. As Dorland's group fought
the enemy a stone's throw from his tracks, North Vietnamese positions on Hill 63 and Hill
X took them under fire with machine-gun and recoilless-rifle fire. An anti-tank round
smashed into the APC on which Dorland rode, killed the track commander, and hurled Dorland
to the ground. In the chaos of the moment, the driver spun the track into a defilade
position and ran over Dorland, who was badly injured and in indescribable pain. The medics
treated him where he lay, but the severity of his wounds were beyond their abilities.
Despite his agony, Dorland refused evacuation to stay with his men.
Dorland had other problems besides his
injuries. Well-aimed enemy fire from the two hills threatened to hold his force in a
viselike grip between the lumps of high ground. Dorland remembered: "The NVA was dug
in on both hills, with extensive networks of tunnels. A base of fire was initially laid
down on the hill to our west. While intense fire was directed on the hill, the two
infantry companies were sweeping from the opposite side -- thus squeezing the enemy."
As the ceiling lifted, Dorland began directing
airstrikes onto the enemy's positions west of his command post (CP). A set of
McDonald-Douglas F-4 Phantoms howled low over the CP and delivered the first load of
napalm and 500-pound bombs on the flinty slopes of Hill X. The pilots had placed their
bombs with remarkable accuracy, but the NVA were back up and firing minutes after the
fighters had departed. It would take many more airstrikes before their guns fell silent.
Progress, measured in meters around the rocky
real estate, did not come cheap. There were 50 casualties during the first two hours of
fighting, and losses continued to mount when the fighting spread from the high ground down
into the island hedgerows. As the morning moved toward midday, it became apparent to
Dorland that the battle was turning into a virtual standoff. Dorland radioed Colonel
Gelling for reinforcements. Shortly afterward, the brigade TOC radioed Dorland that
Company B, 3/21 ("Gimlets"), commanded by Captain David Spohn, was on the way.
At 0915, 12 UH-1 helicopters from the 71st
Combat Aviation Company ("Rattlers"), carrying the 1st and 2nd platoons of
Company B, 3/21, swooped into the valley. Earlier, Dorland had Company B, 4/31, secure a
landing zone (LZ) for medical evacuation, and it was planned that the aircraft carrying
Company B's troops would land there. For some reason, the Rattlers touched down in a paddy
several hundred meters away from Bierschmidt's LZ. Spohn's troops spilled out of the Hueys
and into a maelstrom of enemy fire. One of Company B's elements became isolated and pinned
down.
Dorland swiftly dispatched a platoon of cavalry
and the tank section to assist the beleaguered Gimlets. The tanks ran into immediate
problems in the wet paddies, but both elements were able to link up with Company B.
Spohn's men got their bearings and pushed forward, supported by the combined fires of the
armored vehicles. Company B gained 50 meters before it was stopped by a storm of fire
coming from a hedgerow. The North Vietnamese were as determined as ever to hold their
ground.
Dorland placed airstrikes on the enemy bunkers
and directed Company B, 4/31, to assist Spohn and the cavalry. As yellow and red smoke
wafted up through the green hedgerows, marking units' locations, more fighter aircraft
shrieked low across the battlefield to strike the enemy's positions. When the fighters had
expended their ordnance, gunships from the 71st Aviation Company ("Firebirds")
whirled in behind them to unleash a barrage of rockets into the enemy's positions. The
soldiers of the 3rd NVA Regiment had constructed the positions with great care, and it
took a direct hit by a 250-pound bomb or a near-miss by one of the larger ones to knock
out a bunker.
Before the smoke from the rockets and bombs
had cleared from the airstrikes, the armor and infantry were back on line grinding their
way slowly through the hedgerows. The tanks and infantry worked as teams. The tank
commanders had the benefit of height and were often able to see the enemy bunker first and
obliterate it with a round of 90mm fired point-blank. If the infantry found the enemy
position, the riflemen marked the bunker with tracers for the tank's gunner. Often,
however, the infantrymen used fire and movement to pin down the bunker's occupants and
destroy the position with grenades or explosive.
As Dorland attempted to suppress the guns on
Hill X and deal with the problems comfronting Company B, 3/21, Mellon and the cavalry
continued the gut-wrenching job of rooting the enemy from their positions on Hill 63. The
fighting between Mellon's company and the North Vietnamese soldiers was fierce, close and
deadly. The enemy soldiers held their positions and refused surrender, choosing instead to
die in place.
From Mellon's position at the saddle, he could
see a number of friendly elements who had advanced faster than he had, and who were now in
his line of march. His 2nd Platoon had linked with one of these units and was working to
eliminate enemy bunkers along the base of the hill. With his path crowded with friendly
troops, Mellon picked up an APC and took his 3rd Platoon on an end run to get behind two
NVA bunkers that were badgering him. As they reached the rear of the bunkers, the APC's
gunner began pouring .50-caliber machine-gun fire into the larger of the two.
The heavy machine-gun fire must have gotten the
enemy's attention. Four NVA soldiers ran from a clump of bamboo beside the bunker, firing
their AK-47s. The 4th Platoon, shooting from above, dropped all of them with several quick
bursts of fire. Another enemy soldier dashed from the smaller bunker, collided with
Mellon's radio operator, then did a 180-degree turn and scurried back into the shelter.
When efforts by the company's interpreter to get the man to surrender failed, Mellon
tossed a grenade into the bunker and killed him.
Meanwhile, fire from the APC's .50 caliber had
punched a hole about the size of a loaf of bread in the larger bunker. Mellon said:
"We were out of C-4 so my men borrowed two Claymores [mines] from the APC and
duct-taped them to a bamboo pole. After inserting the business end into the hole and
detonating it, my men argued whether one Claymore would not have been enough to destroy
the bunker."
By noon, Company D, 4/31, had ferreted out the
last enemy positions on Hill 63, thus allowing Dorland to concentrate his efforts on the
enemy to his west. More reinforcements were also on the way. At 1330, Colonel Gelling
inserted Captain Joe Stringham's Company C, 4/31, into an LZ about 800 meters southwest of
Hill 63. Stringham quickly cleared the LZ and headed for the fight. Charlie Company had
gone only a few hundred meters before it became embroiled in a firefight that would last
until dark.
At 1500, Dorland called for the battalion's
command and control helicopter. The enemy's attack had slackened, and Dorland wanted to
review the situation from the air. Dorland reported that dead NVA soldiers, weapons and
abandoned equipment littered the battle area. The helicopter reconnaissance was Dorland's
last significant act as commander. He had grown steadily weaker from his wounds, but he
fought to stay until the job was done. Late that afternoon Dorland was given a direct
order to leave the field. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, the 4/31 commander, flew into the
battle area carrying a PRC-25 radio and took charge of the task force.
As darkness fell, the units established
defensive perimeters and prepared for the next day. With Hill 63 secure, the plan was to
trap the NVA in the pocket northwest of the two hills and the Ly Ly River. Two additional
rifle companies were scheduled to join the task force the next morning to block enemy
escape routes along the river. Company C, 4/31, would sweep and clear enemy positions on
Hill X that had cursed Dorland during the day; Company D, 4/31, would sweep north; and
Bierschmidt and Spohn's companies would continue to push west to clear the islands of
enemy.
The operation kicked off the next morning under
dingy, low-hanging skies. Company C, 4/31, swept and cleared Hill X with little contact,
then established a blocking position west of the hill late that afternoon. The other units
were not so fortunate. Spohn and Bierschmidt's companies ran into stiff opposition as they
attempted to push west. Company D, 4/31, supported by tanks and APCs, ran into a firestorm
when they tried to push north across the open paddy.
Company B, 2/1, and my rifle company, Company
D, 3/21, were airlifted into the area shortly before 0930 and established blocking
positions northwest of the battle area as planned. By noon, both units reported light
contact with the enemy. Later in the afternoon, the two units killed 13 NVA soldiers who
were trying to escape from the pocket.
As the battle continued throughout the day,
Colonel Thomas concentrated artillery and tank fire on the Communist positions. When the
weather improved later that afternoon, Thomas pummeled the enemy with back-to-back
airstrikes. The North Vietnamese, unwilling to give ground, fought with the same fierce
determination as they had the day before.
That evening, Thomas turned his attention
toward two islands near the river that make up the hamlet of Dong Son one. Company C,
4/31, was assigned the southern most island. Company D, 4/31, would take the large island
to the north. At 0100 on November 25, Captain Stringham moved his company into position
for the attack. Mellon's objective lay across a large rice paddy a few hundred meters from
his night laager site. He would jump off from there.
The attack kicked off early the next morning.
Company D, with two tanks and a platoon of APCs in support, came under heavy automatic
weapons fire as it approached the rice paddy.
Mellon said: "While the fire was totally
ineffective at the time, I felt it could get worse. I halted our advance and brought up
the two tanks and four APCs on line to bring their fire on the objective. Lieutenant
Colonel Thomas couldn't give me artillery, but he had no objection to me bringing in
airstrikes. When I dialed up the local forward air controller, the voice that came back
was one I recognized well -- Sampan Rambler 26. He and I had worked together many times
since I had come to work for the 4/31 Infantry in June 1967."
Sampan Rambler 26 was able to divert a flight
of McDonnell-Douglas F-4 fighter-bombers out of
Light automatic weapons fire coming from the
smaller island caused Mellon to turn his attention to the south. It took only minutes for
him to sweep the second island, but as before, the enemy were gone by the time he arrived.
Mellon said: "Except for some scrub next
to the paddy, the island was bare. We scoured every inch of the ground but found no bodies
or pieces of bodies anywhere. However, we did find lots of pieces of weapons, rucksacks,
pith helmets and web gear. While we were loading all of this material on one of the APCs,
I called Lieutenant Colonel Thomas to give him the news and ask him for new directions. He
called us back to the northwest base of Hill X where we spent the night after having
Thanksgiving dinner."
The 196th Light Infantry Brigade's baptismal
battle with the 2nd NVA Division was over. One hundred and twenty-eight soldiers from the
3rd NVA Regiment's 5th and 7th companies lay dead. Fifty-six enemy weapons were captured.
The price of victory was seven Americans killed and another 84 wounded in action. Body
count, captured enemy gear and other statistics were the standard measure of success or
failure at the time, but the reasons for winning in battle are more than a tally of the
number of dead enemy soldiers.
The brigade's victory at Hill 63 can be
attributed to superb leadership beginning with Major Dorland and going down to the most
junior fire-team leader in the task force. And guts. Dorland was wounded at a critical
time in the battle, and though his injuries were severe, he doggedly remained with his
men. Had he allowed himself to be evacuated at that juncture, one can only speculate what
impact his departure might have had on the battle. The men in the tanks, tracks and
infantry platoons also exhibited a matchless, sometimes impetuous, courage against a
tenacious enemy. In Dorland's words, "The men fought valiantly, and attacked without
hesitation."
(Major Gilbert Dorland was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross for the action on November 23, 1967.)
